Abstract. We consider a first-price auction when the ranking of bidders' private valuations is common knowledge among bidders. This new informational framework is motivated by several applications, from procurement to privatization. It induces a particular asymmetric auction model with affiliated private values that has several interesting properties but raises serious technical complications. We prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in pure strategies and show that the seller's revenue is generally higher in a first-price than in second-price and English auctions, in contrast to the ranking in the affiliated values model by Milgrom and Weber. This also implies that in first-price auctions, providing information concerning the ranking of valuations among bidders tends to increase the seller's expected revenue.
Introduction
The theoretical auction literature has very strong results for the symmetric independent private values framework, some of which have been extended and We are grateful to John Riley, Philippe Fevrier, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. modified for the symmetric affiliated values model. 1 However, in many applications the symmetry assumption is not plausible. Therefore, the literature has begun to analyze different kinds of asymmetries between bidders.
Adhering to the independent, private values framework, several authors have assumed that bidders' valuations are drawn from different probability distributions which are common knowledge among them. Already in the early literature, Vickrey (1961) considers auctions with two bidders where one knows the other's valuation with certainty, and Griesmer et al. (1967) analyze first-price auctions with two bidders whose valuations are uniformly distributed over different supports. More recently, Plum (1992) analyzes the two bidder case for arbitrary continuous distribution functions, proves that the first-price auction has a unique pure strategy equilibrium with strictly monotone increasing bid functions, and computes the equilibrium strategies for a class of parametric distribution functions. Using the same framework, Maskin and Riley (2000a) explain the properties of several asymmetric two bidder examples, assuming a strong stochastic order between distribution functions (stronger than first-order stochastic dominance). Maskin and Riley (2000b) , Reny (1999) and Simon and Zame (2000) analyze existence of pure strategy equilibria in first-price auctions, and Lebrun (1999) analyzes existence and uniqueness of pure strategy equilibria for the n-bidder case. 2 In this paper we consider another kind of asymmetry among bidders. We assume that bidders do not only know their own valuation, but also know the ranking of valuations. With two bidders, this means that the identity of the bidder with the highest valuation is common knowledge. This assumption induces an asymmetry among bidders that cannot be subsumed under the approach by Plum, Lebrun, and Maskin and Riley, because after knowing their ranking and their own valuation, each bidder computes conditional probabilities of other bidders' valuations that are not common knowledge among them, and indeed induces distinct results.
To motivate the kind of asymmetry assumed in this paper, consider a procurement auction in which bidders know who is the strongest bidder. This information may be due to experience accumulated in other bidding occasions or from industrial espionage. Similarly, in art auctions bidders often revise their strategies after they learn that some wealthy collector participates who is known to have a higher valuation. And in privatization or takeover bidding, participants often have access to information about each others' financial resources or other idiosyncratic features that affect bidders' valuations. 1 For basic results of standard auction models see the surveys by McAfee and McMillan (1987) , Milgrom (1989) , Matthews (1995) , and Wolfstetter (1996) . 2 The different proofs of existence employ very different methods. Maskin and Riley (2000b) use topological methods developed by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) . Plum (1992) and Lebrun (1999) establish directly that a solution to a suitable set of differential equations exists. Reny (1999) employs his concept of "payoff secure" games. And Simon and Zame (2000) view the tie-breaking rule as part of the solution of the game, and show that there is always some tie-breaking rule for which an equilibrium exists.
Also note that the solution of an auction game induced by our model, where the ranking of valuations is common knowledge among bidders, is an essential ingredient of the analysis of some important multi-stage bidding games. This is relevant in auction settings with several rounds of bidding before a transaction takes place. Another case are auctions in which several identical units are sold sequentially to the same set of bidders and, after each round, bidders find out who the winner was but do not observe the winning bid. For example, in Italy the formerly state owned industrial conglomerate ENI 3 was privatized using precisely such a procedure with essentially two rounds. In the first round bidders submitted sealed bids and reorganization plans. Then, the auctioneer screened out the lowest bidders, informed the remaining bidders whether their bid was the highest or not, without revealing the highest bid, and finalized the sale in a first-price auction, with the proviso that bids could not be lowered at this second stage. Clearly, in the analysis of this and similar auction games, one has to solve all subgames, including the subgames in which bidders have revealed the ranking of their valuations through their first-round bids, regardless of whether these subgames happen to occur on the equilibrium path of that game.
Although we start our model as one where valuations are independent, and the distribution of valuations is common knowledge among bidders, after having incorporated the information about ranking, the resulting conditional distributions are not common knowledge. Yet, the resulting environment can be analyzed as a game with common knowledge of the distribution on types provided that one assumes that valuations are drawn from a commonly known joint probability distribution with a triangular support (in case of two bidders), and where the higher valuation is assigned to one particular bidder (say bidder 1).
Technically speaking, knowing the ranking of valuations induces a particular stochastic dependence or affiliation of valuations, even if the original context was that of independent valuations. Indeed, it leads to an affiliated values model in the spirit of Milgrom and Weber (1982) , however, without their crucial assumption of a symmetric distribution of signals. Therefore, our model can be viewed on one hand as a particular extension of the Milgrom and Weber model that considers a specific asymmetric distribution -triangular, and on the other hand as an extension of the asymmetric models of Maskin and Riley (2000a), Lebrun, and Plum to particular asymmetric values which are not independent.
Our main results are as follows: -The first-price auction has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies with strictly monotone increasing bid functions. -The first-price auction is generally inefficient (with positive probability), and the well-known ranking of auction forms based on Milgrom and Weber's (1982) symmetric affiliated values model can be reversed. -Assuming a uniform prior distribution function, the low valuation bidder bids more aggressively than the high valuation bidder, and both bid more aggressively than in the associated symmetric game.
-Assuming a uniform prior distribution function, the first-price auction is more profitable for the seller. As for the bidders, the low valuation bidder also prefers the first-price auction, whereas the high valuation bidder prefers the second-price auction. However, ex ante, before the ranking of valuations is known, bidders prefer the second-price auction.
Our results imply that the information structure that we address may be attractive for the auctioneer; therefore, an interesting question is whether the auctioneer can induce or exploit it strategically. This is in fact the topic of work in progress by Kaplan and Zamir (2000) . Some of these results, such as the potential inefficiency of the first-price auction and the failure of revenue equivalence, extend results obtained in the asymmetric auction framework developed by Plum, Maskin and Riley, and Lebrun to another asymmetric auction environment. However, other results, such as bidders' preference for auction formats, differ.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we present the model and explain its relationship to the affiliated values model. In Sect. 3 we prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in pure strategies; the proof is by construction. In general, the game does not have an analytic solution even in the case of simple distributions. In Sect. 4 we elaborate on the ranking of auction formats by the seller and by bidders, and compare our results with those obtained in the independent, asymmetric private values model by Plum, Maskin and Riley, and Lebrun. Some of the more technical arguments are spelled out in the Appendix.
The model
Consider a first-price auction where an indivisible good is auctioned to two risk neutral bidders. The seller's reserve price is equal to zero. Valuations v are realizations of a random variable V , independently drawn from a differentiable probability distribution function G(v) with density g := G which is strictly positive on the support [0, 1].
Valuations are privately observed. In addition, each bidder knows whether his valuation is the higher or lower of the two. Furthermore, the ranking of valuations is common knowledge among bidders.
Denote bidders by H and L, where H stands for the bidder with the higher and L for the bidder with lower valuation. Let b H and b L be the respective bid functions and
H the associated inverse bid functions. We restrict the analysis to equilibria in pure and strictly monotone increasing strategies.
As a technical requirement, we assume that the density of G around 0 is positive and bounded away from 0.
An alternative interpretation. The present model is equivalent to the following game in which the players are treated asymmetrically: V 1 and V 2 are independently drawn (according to the distribution G), then V H := max{V 1 , V 2 }, is assigned to bidder 1 (who is called bidder H ) while V L := min{V 1 , V 2 } is assigned to bidder 2 (who is called bidder L). Equivalently, the bidders' valuations V H , V L are drawn from a joint probability distribution with probability density f : V → R, with the triangular support
Of course, V H , V L are stochastically dependent. In fact, from (1) it follows immediately that the affiliation inequality (see Milgrom and Weber 1982)
is satisfied with equality for all vectors of valuationsv,v ∈ V . Therefore, the present model induces a particular auction game with affiliated valuations. The crucial difference to Milgrom and Weber (1982) is that the distribution f is not symmetric.
Although the distribution f is common knowledge among bidders, the mutual beliefs about each other's valuation are not common knowledge (as they were not also in the original interpretation, since V H and V L are not independent). Equilibrium conditions. Suppose bidder H has valuation v and bids x . If the rival bidder plays the strict monotone increasing strategy b L , the probability that H wins is
where
To compute the best reply of H , note that in equilibrium min{φ(x ), v} = φ(x ) because otherwise H could lower his bid and still win with certainty. Consequently, the best reply is obtained by solving
It is readily seen that there is a unique local maximum to this problem thus, differentiating (5) with respect to x , and using the fact that in equilibrium x is equal to b H (v) (or equivalently,
Next, consider bidder L with valuation v who bids x . The probability of winning is 4v ∨v denotes the componentwise maximum andv ∧v the componentwise minimum of (v,v ).
Pr{L wins} = Pr{b
Note that, in equilibrium, the bid x must satisfy σ(x ) > v, because otherwise, in order to have a positive probability of winning, L would have to raise his bid. Therefore,
Computing the best reply, as before, one obtains the differential equation
Two boundary conditions apply:
The first boundary condition in (10) follows from the fact that in equilibrium a bidder with v = 0 does not make a positive bid i.e., b
The other boundary condition is due to the fact that in equilibrium the maximum bid, b (that of valuation v = 1), must be the same for both bidders, because if it differed, the bidder with the higher bid could lower it, still win the object with probability 1, and thus strictly increase his expected payoff. Consequently,
Equilibrium
In this section we show that the game has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies. We also note that this solution is generally not an analytic solution (in the sense that the bidding functions have no expansion about 0 to power series with rational powers). In order to prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in pure strategies for arbitrary probability distributions consider the following system:
We prove that this system, to which we refer as the constrained system, has a unique solution. The proof follows from a sequence of Lemmas.
The main idea of the proof is to start from an arbitrary boundary point b, as defined by the first boundary condition in (12) , and move along the trajectories governed by the differential equations in (12) . In what follows, we refer to this system as the partially constrained system (that is the system (12) without the boundary condition at 0). Note, the partially constrained system can be written in the form
By a standard property of ordinary differential equations 5 , for every b ∈ (0, 1) the partially constrained system (13)- (15) has a unique solution which we denote by φ b and σ b . We show that there is exactly one b at which the second boundary condition in (12) is also satisfied i.e., φ
We distinguish between two kinds of solutions to which we refer as Ω 1 , Ω 2 : Proof. The proof is in two parts: (i) We show that for b sufficiently small
Definition 1. A solution of the partially constrained system belongs to
In fact we show that, for this value of b, both functions φ b and σ b are above the line : y = 1/2 + (2/µ)x (see Fig. 1 ). By (12) , the derivatives of the functions are bounded by
(1−b)µ which is smaller than 2/µ, the slope of , and hence both functions are above in the neighborhood of b = µ/4 (see Fig. 1 ).
Assume, contrary to our claim, that the functions do not lie entirely above . Let x 0 be the largest crossing points of one of the two functions, say φ b with . Note that since µ ≤ 1, the slope of is at least 2, so σ b (x 0 ) − x 0 > 1/2 and hence φ b (x 0 ) < 2/µ which means that φ b (x ) is below at the right of x 0 which is in contradiction to the fact that x 0 is the largest crossing point of φ b .
(ii) Let c := min 1 
Proof. By the two differential equations and the first boundary condition in (12) ,
, and σ b (x ) = 0 and hence, σ b (x + ) < φ b (x + ) for sufficiently small , in contradiction to the definition ofx . (ii) The only case that remains to be considered is (12) and thus, obtain a solution starting at b * which is different from (φ b * , σ b * ), in contradiction to the uniqueness theorem. The case φ * = x b * < σ * is ruled out by the same argument used in (Case 1), and we conclude that x b * = φ * = σ * , establishing the continuity.
The continuity implies that for a fixed small > 0 (to be chosen later), there is a small η ( Assume G is uniform on [0, 1]. Rewriting (6), (9) and (10), we obtain
Proposition 1. System (17) does not have an analytic solution.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
Equilibrium properties
How does the introduction of common knowledge concerning the ranking of valuations among bidders affect equilibrium bid functions? Does the bidder with the lower valuation always bid more aggressively? Does it affect the efficiency of the first-price auction? And how does it change the ranking of the seller's expected revenue and bidders' expected payoff in first-and second-price auctions? In the following we draw comparisons to the symmetric independent and the symmetric affiliated private values models, and also to the models of asymmetric auctions by Plum (1992) , Lebrun (1999) , and Maskin and Riley (2000a).
Inefficiency of the first-price auction
Although Lemma 2 was established as part of the proof of Theorem 1, it is of independent interest. It shows that the low valuation bidder bids higher than his rival:
The straightforward intuitive explanation is that otherwise the low valuation bidder would stand no chance of winning, which cannot be part of an equilibrium. An important consequence of this relationship between the bid functions is:
Corollary 1. If the ranking of valuations is common knowledge, the object is awarded to the bidder with the lower valuation with positive probability; therefore, the first-price auction is inefficient.
Proof. For any x ∈ (0, 1) we have σ(x ) > φ(x ). Using the monotonicity of these functions, this implies that any Low bidder with valuation higher than φ(x ) bids more than x while any High bidder with valuation smaller than σ(x ) bids less than x . It follows that whenever both valuations are in the interval (φ(x ), σ(x )), which occurs with positive probability, the low valuation bidder wins the auction and gets the object.
The inefficiency is due to the fact that the two bid functions are apart, and hence the distance between σ and φ is related to the "degree" of inefficiency. For example, if we measure the inefficiency by the probability that bidder L, with the lower valuation, gets the object then it can be easily verified that:
For the uniform distribution, this measure simplifies to
As it has been already noticed in the auction literature, the inefficiency of the first-price auction is closely related to the asymmetry of bidders, and it is of course also a feature of the asymmetric auction model by Plum (1992) , Lebrun (1999) and Maskin and Riley (2000a).
Strategy comparison
Does the present model result in more aggressive bidding by one or both bidders, relative to the standard symmetric independent private value model? Proposition 2 shows that both bidders may bid more aggressively. 
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium bid functions for the uniform distribution case are given in Fig. 2 where we see also the bid function of the symmetric model b(v) = v/2; These functions are from a numerical solution of the differential equations (17).
Fig. 2. Equilibrium bid functions for the uniform distribution case
The numerical integration of this system requires some care because of the singularity at the origin. We used an asymptotic expansion given by (19) , (20) , (23) and (24) in Appendix A to compute the value of φ and σ at dx > 0 for an arbitrary choice of the free parameter α. We then divided [dx , 1] into small subintervals of size dx , and integrated the partially constrained system obtained from (17) by ignoring the second boundary condition, by a finite difference scheme. We started with a small positive α and repeated the procedure outlined above with increasing values of this parameter, until we hit a numerical solution that also satisfies the second boundary condition in (17) . To ensure that the solution obtained is not a numerical artifact, we performed similar calculations with different choices of dx . The solution is plotted in Fig. 2 .
It is natural to ask about the generality of the qualitative properties of the bidding functions stated in Proposition 2. Note first that by Lemma 2, the in-
hold for any distribution and any number of bidders if the identity of the highest valuation is common knowledge among bidders. That is, informing a bidder that he or she does not have the highest valuation results in more aggressive bidding compared to the standard model and more aggressive than the bidder informed to have the highest valuation. However, the inequality b(v) < b H (v), does not always hold. Indeed, there are distributions for which in equilibrium b H (v) < b(v) for some values of v. Such examples were generated numerically and an existence proof is given in the Appendix under the subtitle "counterexample".
We mention that the inequalities
, ∀v, are also observed in Maskin and Riley (2000a), for their notion of strong (our H ) and weak (our L) bidder (see their Proposition 3.5). However, in their framework it cannot occur that the strong bidder bids also more aggressively than in the associated symmetric game, as we have it in the uniform distribution case.
Revenue ranking
As is well-known, in the symmetric independent private values model firstand second-price auctions are payoff equivalent. However, if independence is replaced by affiliation, as proposed by Milgrom and Weber (1982) , the seller's expected revenue is higher in a second-price auction. In the present model, this revenue ranking can be reversed. 6 This may contribute to explain why procurements are usually conducted as first-price auctions.
Proposition 3. If valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution, the seller's expected revenue is higher in a first-price auction than in a second-price (or open English) auction; the low valuation bidder (L) also prefers the first-price auction, whereas the high valuation bidder (H) prefers the second price auction. However, ex ante, before the ranking of valuations is known, bidders unanimously prefer the second-price auction.
Proof. Recall the ranking of bid functions from Proposition 2. It follows immediately that the winning bid is always higher than in the standard symmetric case, for each configuration of valuations, even though the item is not always awarded to the bidder with the highest valuation. Therefore, the seller's revenue is also higher than in the symmetric independent private values model, for each configuration of valuations. Since in a second-price auction bidding is unaffected by the assumed common knowledge, it follows that a first-price auction generates higher revenue to the seller.
Bidder L prefers the first-price auction, because in the second-price auction he stands no chance of winning the auction. In turn, bidder H prefers the secondprice auction, because compared to the first-price auction he wins more often (in fact he always wins in the second-price auction) and consistently pays less in expectation, for each of his valuations. 7 However, ex ante, before the ranking of valuation is known, bidders unambiguously prefer the second-price auction because the seller's expected revenue is higher and the entire expected surplus is lower, due to inefficiency.
The result that the seller prefers the first-price auction to the second-price auction was obtained also in the models by Plum (1992) , Lebrun (1999) and Maskin and Riley (2000a) . However, bidders' ranking of auction formats differs from what was obtained in our model. Indeed, assuming uniform distributions, both bidders may prefer the second-price auction in their asymmetric auctions framework. At first glance this seems to contradict Proposition 3.6 in Maskin and Riley (2000a) where it is claimed that bidders rank auctions in the same way as in our model. Notice, however, that uniform distributions do not satisfy the "conditional stochastic dominance condition" which is assumed in that Proposition, even though uniform distributions are a perfect example of first-oder stochastic dominance. Using Plum's (1992) explicit solution of equilibrium strategies, one can compute bidders' equilibrium payoffs and confirm 8 that both weak and strong bidders may prefer the second-price auction. 9 We have also computed the equilibrium expected revenues for a variety of other probability distributions and always found that making the ranking known among bidders raises the seller's expected revenue and that, if the ranking of valuations is common knowledge among bidders, the first-price auction gives the seller a higher expected revenue than the second-price or English auction. We therefore conjecture that these two properties, derived for the case of the uniform distribution, are valid for a large class of probability distributions. Since the present model can be viewed as an asymmetric affiliated private values auction, this implies that the superiority of the second-price or English auction derived by Milgrom and Weber (1982) does not survive the introduction of asymmetry to the affiliated private values model. 7 Another argument proving the preference of H is: As the expected sellers' payoff is higher in the first-price auction than in the second-price auction, the sum of the two bidders payoffs is lower in the first-price auction. And since the payoff of L is higher in the first-price auction, it must be that the expected payoff of H is lower in the first-price auction than in the second-price auction. 8 An example are uniformly distributed valuations on the support [50, 150], resp. [50, 200] . 9 In footnote 16 on p. 425 of their paper, Maskin and Riley (2000a) write: "Under the weaker assumption of first-order stochastic dominance, it can be shown that the ranking by buyers continues to hold for all those buyers with sufficiently high valuations." This is, evidently, incorrect without additional assumptions on the distributions .
Conclusions
The present paper has modified the standard symmetric private value models, with and without affiliation, by assuming that bidders know the rank order of their valuations. This modification is relevant in many real-world auctions. We presented a constructive proof of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in pure strategies for the first-price sealed bid auction with two bidders. In this equilibrium the low valuation bidder always bids higher (than a high valuation bidder with the same value). Consequently, the first-price auction is not efficient since it occurs with positive probability that the object is sold to the bidder with the lower valuation. In the case of uniformly distributed valuations, we showed that both bidders bid higher than in the standard symmetric case (i.e. without the common knowledge of ranking). Therefore, the seller's revenue is higher for all configurations of valuations. Noting that bidding the true value is a dominant strategy in second-price auction also when the ranking is common knowledge, this indicates that a revenue maximizer seller should prefer the first-price to the second-price auction. This reverses the well-known revenue ranking in private values auctions with and without affiliation.
Applying similar reasoning to (19) , (20) and the second differential equation in (17) , one obtains
These two linear equations in α, β have a non-trivial solution if and only if the determinant of coefficients vanishes, which implies 4 − (k − 1)(
This proves the Lemma since for a solution to be analytic, the exponents must be integers.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The proof of the proposition is obtained as part of a proof of existence of a unique solution of constrained system (17) . As a by-product we thus have two quite different proofs of existence and uniqueness for the uniform distribution case. In general, a system like (17) has a solution if the corresponding partially constrained system (i.e., if the second boundary condition is ignored) has infinitely many solutions. We will show that this is indeed the case.
Restricting attention to the partially constrained system in (17) we observe the following: (iii) the asymptotic behavior of every solution, near x = 0, is described by the following power series expansions which are obtained by inserting k from (24) into (19) , (20) φ(x ) = 4 3 x + αx
σ(x ) = 2x + βx
Inserting k = 2 + √ 13 into (22) and (23) yields two linearly dependent equations and therefore they have one parameter family of solutions:
Define the functions q(x ) := φ(x )/x and h(x ) := σ(x )/x . Rewriting the two first differential equation in (17) in terms of q(x ) and h(x ) gives
and dividing (28) by (29) yields The two directions ξ 1 and ξ 2 are indicated in Fig. 3 . The trajectory at the direction of ξ 1 is irrelevant to our dynamic system: Since r 1 < 0, a solution of the form δ = ξ 1 exp(r 1 t) does not satisfy δ → 0 as t → −∞ (which is the first boundary condition at x = 0). On the other hand, the trajectory starting at ω in the direction ξ 2 is the "unstable manifold" of the system, that is, this is the solution that leaves the critical point ω as t increases from −∞ (or as x increases from 0). This corresponds to a negative value of β in (20) (see also (27)). The slope of this trajectory cannot become positive before it hits the line q = h, because a reversal requires that it becomes zero somewhere, which cannot occur as long as h < 2 (see Fig. 3 ). Therefore, the trajectory must cross the line q = h at some point that we denote by f * . While there is a unique trajectory of this sort, it corresponds to infinitely many solutions of the system {(28), (29)} (or to the two differential equations in (17) ) that differ in their "speed" c. To choose the "right" speed we choose c for which
Since other solutions move either faster or slower along the same trajectory, there is a unique solution that satisfies (33). Taking now b * = 1/f * we have:
Thus, we establish a unique solution to the full system (17) with b * ∈ ( 1 2 , 1) (since f * ∈ (1, 2) ). As we proved, along the equilibrium trajectory the function h is always smaller than 2 which implies that h(x ) = σ(x )
x < 2, and therefore σ(x ) < 2x . and by Lemma 2, φ(x ) < σ(x ) < 2x . Recalling that 2x is the inverse of the symmetric case bidding function b(v) = v/2, we conclude that
Counterexample. Consider the constrained system (12) with the class of distributions for which we proved the existence and uniqueness of solution namely, distributions G which have a Taylor expansion around 0:
with α > 0. This implies that the density q has the expansion (around 0):
Recall that in the symmetric case, the inverse bidding function ρ := b −1 is determined by the following differential equation (which can be easily derived directly),
with the boundary condition ρ(0) = 0.
First it can be shown although, the inverse bidding functions may be not analytic at 0, they do have the first two terms of Taylor expansion (linear and quadratic; non rational powers must be higher than 2). Using the Taylor expansion for G in equation (34), we obtain the following asymptotic expansion of ρ(x ) near x = 0, ρ(x ) = 2x + Cx 2 + o(x 2 ) with C = − 4β 3α .
On the other hand carrying out an asymptotic expansion for φ(x ) and σ(x ) (near x = 0), solving the differential equations of the system (12), we obtain that both in φ(x ) and σ(x ) the second term (after the linear term) is quadratic (again, non-rational powers must be higher than 2): 
